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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Limitation of Actions-Claims Between Spouses
In an action by a wife against her husband to establish a resulting or constructive trust in land or, in the alternative, to recover
money advanced to the husband for improvements in consideration
of his oral promise to convey to her a one-half interest in land held
in the husband's name, it was held that the wife's evidence was insufficient to establish either a resulting or a constructive trust and
that her alternative action based on implied contract was barred
by the statute of limitations.' The court concluded that notwithstanding the continuance of the marital relationship the statute of
limitations had commenced running at the time of the husband's
repudiation of his agreement to convey.
The controversy whether statutes of limitations should be applied, during coverture, to claims between spouses appears to have
arisen primarily from the common-law fictional unity of the spouses
with the consequent disability of the wife to sue her husband and
the policy of the law to encourage domestic peace and tranquility.2
The emergence of so-called "married women's" acts relieving
married women of many of the common-law disabilities gave rise
to the question whether these statutes, by eliminating the wife's
inability to sue, had repealed by implication the married-women's
'Fulp v. Fulp, .264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965). The statute provides a three-year limitation period for actions "upon a contract, obligation or
liability arising out of a contract, express or implied.. .

."

N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 1-52(1) (1953). The application of the statute of limitations to contracts
implied in law seems both historically and statutorily sound. At commonlaw, contracts implied in law were cognizable at law by writ of assumpsit.
CoiNnr, CONTRACTS § 19 (1963). Furthermore, in all cases in which equity

and law might have concurrent jurisdiction, the courts of equity were bound
by the limitations statutes and did not act merely in analogy to it. Falls v.
Torrance, 11 N.C. 412 (1826); KELLY, CODE LIMITATIONS OF AcTIONS §
47 (1903); 1 MCINTOSH, N.C. PRACTCE & PROCEDURE § 273 (2d ed. 1956).

By statute, "The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
and the forms of such actions and suits are abolished, and there is but
one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and
the redress of private wrongs, which is denominated a civil action." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-9 (1953). Under this statute, the statute of limitations
would, apply to both legal and equitable claims. 1 MCINTOSH, supra at § 273.
2 See, e.g., Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410, 5 N.E. 718 (1886) ; In
the Matter of Estate of Crawford, 155 Kan. 388, 125 P.2d 354 (1942);
Morris v. Pennsgrove Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 219, 170 At.
16 (Ch. 1934); Alpaugh v. Wilson, 52 N.J. Eq. 424, 28 Atl. 722 (Ch.
1894); Stockwell v. Stockwell's Estate, 92 Vt. 489, 105 Atl. 30 (1918);
Second Nat'l Bank v. Merrill & Houston Iron-works, 81 Wis. 151, 50
N.W. 505 (1891). See generally Annot., 121 A.L.R. 1382 (1939).
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exemption from the limitations statutes.3 Conflicting decisions were
4
reached with no discernible majority rule.
Subsequently, many state legislatures expressly eliminated coverture from the list of statutory disabilities under limitations statutes;
but, even absent this saving clause, the weight of authority held that
claims between spouses were exempt from the statute during continuance of the marital relation. 5 The basic reasoning applied by
these courts seems to have been that even though the spouses are
permitted to bring actions against each other during coverture,
public policy demands the exemption of such claims from the compulsive force exerted by statutes of limitations.6 Thus, the limitation
period will begin running only upon termination of the marriage
through death or divorce.' However, when the limitation period
'Originally statutes of limitations were viewed with disfavor and judicial exceptions were implied at every opportunity. See Richards v. Maryland Ins. Co., 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 84 (1814). In later years, however,
statutes of limitations were considered as applicable to all causes of action
not specially excepted by the legislature. See M'Iver v. Ragan, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 25 (1817).
'See Smith's Ex'r v. Johns, 154 Ky. 274, 157 S.W. 21 (1913) (no
repeal by implication); Brown v. Cousens, 51 Me. 301 (1864) (repeal by
implication); Lindell Real-Estate Co. v. Lindell, 142 Mo. 61, 43 S.W. 368
(1897) (no repeal by implication); Wiesner v. Zaun, 39 Wis. 188 (1875)
(no repeal by implication).
'E.g., Hamby v. Brooks, 86 Ark. 448, 111 S.W. 277 (1908); Mergenthaler v. Mergenthaler, 69 Cal. App. 2d 525, 160 P.2d 121 (Dist. Ct. App.
1945); Fourthman v. Fourthman, 15 Ind. App. 199, 43 N.E. 965 (1896);
Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410, 5 N.E. 718 (1886); Yeomans v.
Petty, 40 N.J. Eq. 495, 4 Atl. 631 (Ch. 1885); Cary v. Cary, 159 Ore.
578, 80 P.2d 886 (1938); Morrish v. Morrish, 262 Pa. 192, 105 At. 83
(1918) (dictum); Stockwell v. Stockwell's Estate, 92 Vt. 489, 105 Atl. 30
(1918); Brader v. Brader, 110 Wis. 423, 85 N.W. 681 (1901) (affirmed
rule without giving assent thereto in order to protect those who had relied
upon it); Second Nat'l Bank v. Merrill & Houston Iron-works, 81 Wis.
151, 50 N.W. 505 (1891) (dictum).
'The best-considered decisions upon the subject in hand, even since the
Married Women's Property Acts, are to the effect, that owing to the
social importance of maintaining the family relation, in suits between
wives and their husbands for the protection of the former's property,
statutes of limitation, as also presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time,
ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife, since she cannot be expected
to treat her husband as a stranger. As certain courts have well said,
any other policy would be apt to beget disagreements and contentions
in the family fatal to domestic peace....
Morrish v. Morrish, 262 Pa. 192 at 201, 105 At. 83 at 86 (dictum). See
1 Wis. L. REv. 378 (1922).
' As to mere separations, a distinction seems to have been drawn by
some courts between amicable separations with a possibility of reconciliation
and separations which lack this element. In jurisdictions in which the
public policy argument prevails, this distinction would seem to be necessary
in view of the fact that, since the limitation is tolled during cohabitation
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has begun running on a claim before coverture, the general rule is
that the subsequent marriage of the parties does not toll the statute."
This result, when applied in majority-rule jurisdictions, would
appear to come into direct conflict with the public policy foundation
of the initial exemption, i.e. the policy of strengthening the family
relation by refusing to compel spouses to sue during coverture or
suffer their claim to become barred by lapse of time would seem to
be as applicable to claims arising prior to as well as subsequent to
the marriage of the parties. In both cases, the threat of forcing
litigation between spouses during marriage would appear to be the
target to which the policy argument is directed.
There would appear also to be some question as to the validity
of the basic premise upon which the policy argument is founded.
The compulsory effect of the running of limitations may indeed
result in claims between -spouses and thus afford evidence of a
corruption of the domestic peace and tranquility; but, the true
threat to the maintenance of the family relation would seem to be
the underlying wrong done, not the formal action based thereon. 9
Consequently, it might be argued that suit by the wife merely
places a preoccurring breach of the marital relationship upon the
public stage-it is the result, not the cause, of the family discord.,'
On the other hand, there is the possibility that a reconciliation
will more likely occur where the injustices of the home have not
been placed before the public. However, it would seem that mere
exemption of the claim from the running of the limitation period
in the interest of family peace, the reason for the rule actually gains force

where separation with a tenuous possibility of reconciliation has intervened.
See Hampton v. Hampton Holding Co., 17 N.J. 431, 439, 111 A.2d 761,

765 (1955) (dictum); Lineweaver's Estate, 284 Pa. 384, 390, 131 Adt.
378, 380 (1925) (dictum).

. People Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Renz, 203 Ky. 566, 262 S.W. 951

(1924); Graves v. Howard, 159 N.C. 594, 75 S.E. 998 (1912); Charmley

v. Charmley, 125 Wis. 297, 103 N.W. 1106 (1905).

Contra, Fourthman v.

Fourthman, 15 Ind. App. 199, 43 N.E. 965 (1896); Morris v. Pennsgrove

Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 715 N.J. Eq. 219, 170 Adt. 16 (Ch. 1934).
"A litigation of the kind between husband and wife may be unseemly

and abhorrent to our ideas of propriety, but a litigation in one form can be
no more so than in another, and no more so than the necessity itself which
gives rise to the litigation. . .

."

Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447, 454 (1868).

"0In Fulp, a separation had resulted from the domestic discord prior to
the bringing of the wife's action. 264 N.C. at 22, 140 S.E.2d at 711. It

would seem arguable that where a cause of action is evidence itself of a
prior deterioration and collapse of the family relation there remains in fact
no family relation to protect.
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would have little effect upon the occurrence of a reconciliation,
unless such reconciliation is based upon the wife's forgiving today
on the hope of suing tomorrow. It appears doubtful that any such
reconciliation would in fact lead to a strengthening of the family
relation.
In judging the persuasiveness of the public policy argument, it
should also be noted that the limitations statutes themselves are
founded upon the broader policy that it is best to suppress fraudulent
and stale claims from springing up after great lapses of time and
surprising the parties when the evidence may be lost, the facts
obscure, and the witnesses absent.11 It would seem, therefore, that
the policy of maintaining family peace must be considered in conjunction with the policy of protecting other interested parties from
stale claims."2
In jurisdictions applying the statute of limitations to claims
between husband and wife during marriage, the reasoning of the
courts has been that since the limitations statute contains no express
exemption in favor of such causes of action, the courts cannot
engraft such an exemption into the statute.'3 Such a theory would
appear to be applicable in North Carolina. Not only is coverture no
longer a bar to a wife's maintaining an action against her husband,' 4
but it has also been expressly stricken from the disability exemptions to the North Carolina statute of limitations.' 5 This deletion
was made notwithstanding a statutory command that "civil actions
can only be commenced within the periods prescribed . . . except

where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.""
The command of the statute would seem to evidence an explicit
1 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342 (1944); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
' See In the Matter of Estate of Crawford, 155 Kan. 388, 125 P.2d
354 (1942). The "dead man's statute," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1953),
offers some protection, but its effect is no greater a safeguard in the
husband-wife claim situation than in other situations subject to the running
of limitations. Since the husband presumptively holds his wife's property
in trust for her, it appears that § 8-51 may actually be less effective in the
family claim cases.
"it re Estate of Deaner, 126 Iowa 701, 102 N.W. 825 (1905); Wyatt
v. Wyatt, 81 Miss. 219, 32 So. 317 (1902) ; It re Lange's Estate, 91 N.E.2d
546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
"Graves v. Howard, 159 N.C. 594, 75 S.E. 998 (1912) (containing
dictum to the effect that the statute of limitations should run on the wife's
claim).
Laws 1899, ch. 78.
"'N.C.
"N.C. Sess.
GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
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legislative intent that married women be removed from any and all
disability exemptions. Upon this ground alone the North Carolina
17
result would appear to be correct.
Furthermore, it would seem that the result reached in Fulp
could be justified on the ground that exemption of claims between
spouses from the running of limitations does not in fact strengthen
the family relation. This position, noted previously, might be
maintained on the additional ground that even when a complete
reconciliation is accomplished, there is no longer a wrong for which
a remedy is required.
However, it could be maintained that a distinction should be
made between situations in which the husband has wronged his wife
or her property by an overt act and those situations in which the
delict has been his failure to act."8 Though, in reality, it may be
that the wife should not be expected to bring an action to compel
her husband to repay a loan, perform his promise or otherwise fulfill
a legal obligation to her, such a distinction as stated above seems
unnecessary. Since the husband is presumed to hold in trust any
property given him by his wife,'" it appears that it will generally
take an overt act by the husband to start the running of the statute
against his wife's claim. In such a situation the only burden on the
wife would seem to be the burden of determining whether her
See cases cited note 13 supra.
No such distinction has been made in the cases. Compare Morrish v.
Morrish, 262 Pa. 192, 105 Atl. 83 (1918) (limitations did not run against
wife on claim for cancellation of deed on grounds of fraud), with Stockwell
v. Stockwell's Estate, 92 Vt. 489, 105 Atl. 30 (1918) (Wife's claim for
money loaned husband is not barred by limitations). Compare In re Lange's
Estate, 91 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (Wife's claim for money loaned
is barred by limitations), with Rosenberger v. Mallerson, 92 Mo. App. 27
(1901) (Wife's action for conversion is barred by limitations). See also
Posnick v. Posnick, 160-A.2d 804 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960), in which
it was held that where the wife had been involved in constant litigation with
her husband for six years and had merely failed to join the claim in question with her earlier actions, the statute of limitations barred her claim.
17
18

1"

Where a wife voluntarily delivers her money to her husband the law

will presume, in the absence of direct evidence that it was intended as a
gift, that he takes it as trustee for her. Etheredge v. Cochran, 196 N.C. 681,
682, 146 S.E. 711, 712 (1929). Claims by the cestui que trust for breach of

the trust are not subject to the running of limitations until knowledge of
the trustee's repudiation of the trust has reached the claimant. Solon Lodge

v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957). Neither do limitations
run against a cestui que trust in possession. Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C.

11, 17, 84 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1954).
For discussion of the running of limitations in the constructive trust
situation see 44 N.C.L. REv. 202 (1965).

202
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Such a

burden would not seem to create a threat to the maintenance of the
family relation. However, where the wife's claim is to be subject
to the running of limitations, perhaps it would better serve the
policy of striving for domestic peace to require a clear showing of
repudiation by the husband.2 1
The protection of the family relation is a worthy policy; but,
when used in support of judicial determinations, it would seem to
stand as a statement of a conclusion only, leaving vacant the area
of discussion in which should fall the reasons why and the manner
by which the decision has in fact supported the stated policy. The
danger appears when "the protection of the family relation" becomes a mere shibboleth of the courts to be utilized perfunctorily in
engrafting judicial exemptions into the statute of limitations.
RoBERT

0. KLEPFER, JR.

Limitation of Actions-Equitable Remedies-Repudiation
In consideration of her husband's oral promise to convey to her
a one-half interest in land held in the husband's name, the wife
advanced him money for improvements.' Upon completion of the
improvements and in answer to his wife's request to put her name
on the deed, the husband replied: "'You don't think I am a damn
'0Further protection is afforded by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1953),
which provides that for relief based upon fraud or mistake the cause of
action is not deemed to have accrued until the aggrieved party has or should
have discovered such fraud or mistake. In addition, "... equity will deny
the right to assert that defense [running of limitations] when delay has
been induced by acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which
would amount to a breach of good faith. ..." Nowell v. Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1959) (defendant's promises to correct defects estopped him to plead limitations).
" In the rare case in which the husband has a claim based upon his
wife's failure to act, exemption of his claim from the running of limitations
would appear of little consequence, since whatever he gives his wife is
presumptively a gift. Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228
(1960); Shoe v. Hood, 251 N.C. 719, 725, 112 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1960). It
appears, therefore, that since lapse of time would decrease the possibilities
of overcoming the presumption, it is doubtful that the exemption would be
utilized.
'Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965). It should be noted
that in North Carolina full performance by one of the parties to a contract
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds does not take the contract out
of the statute. Carter v. Carter, 182 N.C. 186, 108 S.E. 765 (1921).

